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Abstract
We provide conditions under which a Condorcet winner exists when
voters are exogenously distributed in groups, with preferences satisfying
the single-crossing property separately inside each group. We also show
that the majority voting social preference is acyclic.
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1 Motivation
The single-crossing property (SCP) of preferences is a well known sufficient con-
dition for the existence of a majority voting equilibrium on unidimensional choice
domains: see for instance Gans and Smart (1996). SCP requires that, if a voter’s
type prefers a larger option to a smaller one, then so do all voters with a larger
type. Unlike single-peakedness, SCP guarantees that the majority voting social
preference is transitive, and corresponds to the median voter’s.
The popularity of this concept is due to the large set of environments satisfying
Gans and Smart (1996)’s premises, where voters care about two dimensions linked
by some budget constraint. Take for instance the canonical example inspired by
Roberts (1977). A continuum of agents have the same quasi-linear utility function
c−V (l) where c is consumption, l labor supply, with the disutility from supplying
labor, V (.), increasing and convex. Agents differ in productivity: the maximum
productivity is denoted by θ¯ and an agent with type θ ∈ [0, θ¯] choosing to work l
enjoys the consumption level c = (1−t)(θ¯−θ)l+T , where t ∈ [0, 1] is a proportional
tax on income while T is a lump-sum transfer received from the government.
Agents vote over t and then choose how much labor l to supply. With quasi-linear
preferences, individual labor supply only depends on the type θ and the tax rate t,
and is denoted by l∗(t, θ). Plugging it in the utility function, we obtain the indirect
utility of an individual of type θ, V (t, T ) = (1− t)(θ¯− θ)l∗(t, θ) + T − V (l∗(t, θ)).
The marginal rate of substitution between t and T is given by
−
∂V (t, T )/∂t
∂V (t, T )/∂T
= l∗(t, θ)(θ¯ − θ) (1)
and is monotone (decreasing) in θ if l∗(t, θ) is also monotone (decreasing) in θ, a
condition called “hierarchical adherence” by Roberts (1977). Using the govern-
ment budget constraint to establish that T is a function of t, we obtain from Gans
and Smart (1996) the equivalence between the monotonicity of the marginal rate
of substitution and the SCP over t ∈ [0, 1].
The objective of this note is to study the setting where voters are exogenously
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distributed in groups (i = 1, ..., N), with the SCP satisfied inside each group but
not necessarily across groups (when voters from all groups are pooled together).
For instance, in the previous example, agents may receive a different lump-sum
transfer according to the group they belong to, so that T = γiG(t) where γi > 0 for
all i and where G(t) is the total tax proceeds raised by the government. In other
words, an agent’s type is now bidimensional and consists of her productivity index
θ and the group i she belongs to. Preferences clearly satisfy the SCP property
inside any group i, but when all groups are pooled together it is unclear how to
aggregate the bidimensional type (θ, i) to verify whether the SCP holds or not.1
We now propose a more generic model together with assumptions that are
sufficient to guarantee the existence of a majority voting equilibrium.
2 The generic model
A continuum of voters are distributed among N groups, with µi denoting the
proportion of voters who belong to group i = 1, ..., N . Voters are identified by
the group i they belong to and by their type, denoted by θ. The distribution
of types in group i is given by the distribution function Fi, with density fi over
Θi = [θi, θi]. The policy space is unidimensional and is the same across groups.
That is, agents in all groups have to choose by majority voting one option (for the
whole society) x in the set X = [x, x]. The utility function ui(x, θ) represents the
preferences of voters of type θ ∈ Θi belonging to group i for any option x ∈ X .
We assume that these preferences satisfy the Single-Crossing Property inside
each group i:
Assumption 1
∀i = 1, ..., N, ∀x′, x ∈ X with x′ > x, ∀θ′, θ ∈ Θi with θ
′ > θ,
ui(x
′, θ) ≥ ui(x, θ)⇒ ui(x
′, θ′) ≥ ui(x, θ
′).
1See Remark 2 for a more formal statement.
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Our objective is to prove the existence of a Condorcet winner (an option pre-
ferred by a majority of voters across groups to any other option in X) when all
voters in all groups vote simultaneously.
The set of most-preferred outcomes in X of an individual of type θ belonging
to group i is denoted by
Mi(θ) = argmax
x∈X
ui(x, θ).
We assume that
Assumption 2 Mi(θ) is a function that is continuous and strictly increasing in
θ, ∀i = 1, ..., N and ∀θ ∈ Θi,
and that
Assumption 3 The image of Θi under the function Mi is [x, x] in all groups
i = 1, ..., N .
The crucial part of Assumption 2 is continuity: we come back in the conclusion
to the assumption that Mi(θ) is a function and that it is strictly increasing.
2 De
Donder (2012) shows how the technical Assumption 3 can be weakened.
Remark 1 We have already shown that section 1’s example satisfies Assumption
1 when labor supply is monotone decreasing in θ. Assuming that G(t) is a strictly
concave function is sufficient to guarantee Assumption 2. To satisfy Assumption
3 with [x, x] = [0, tˆ], denote by tˆ the value of t ≤ 1 that maximizes G(t), so that
Mi(θ) = tˆ in all groups i, and assume that the marginal rate of substitution (1)
of an agent with θ = 0 at t = 0 is larger than γiG
′(0), ∀i, so that Mi(0) = 0 in
all groups.
2Theorem 4 of Milgrom and Shannon (1994) guarantees that Mi is weakly increasing in θ.
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Remark 2 Take section 1’s example and assume that labor supply is monotone
decreasing in θ for all t, that G is strictly concave in t and order groups by in-
creasing value of γi. We then have that Mi(θ) is increasing in both θ and i.
We can then choose θ′ in group i and θ in group j with θ′ > θ, i < j and
t′ = Mi(θ
′) < t = Mj(θ). Although Assumption 1 is satisfied in all groups, we
have uj(t, θ) > uj(t
′, θ) and ui(t, θ
′) < ui(t
′, θ′) so that SCP is violated when we
pool voters from all groups and identify them only by their productivity parameter
θ.
Since Mi(θ) is continuous and strictly increasing in θ (Assumption 2) with the
same image [x, x] in all groups (Assumption 3), we know from the intermediate
value theorem that, for any x ∈ [x, x], there exists a unique type θ∗i (x) in all
groups who prefers x to any other feasible option.
We now prove that
Proposition 1 Under Assumptions 1, 2 and 3,
(a) there exists at least one option x ∈ X, which we denote xCW , such that
∑
µiFi(θ
∗
i (x
CW )) = 1/2, (2)
(b) xCW is a Condorcet winner in the set X,
(c) Although the majority voting social preference over X need not correspond to
that of any individual’s type, it is acyclic.
Proof: (a) Observe that θ∗i (x) is continuous and strictly increasing in x . Then
there exists at least one value xCW ∈ [x, x] that is such that
∑
µiFi(θ
∗
i (x
CW )) = 1/2.
(b) We now prove that xCW gathers at least one half of the votes when faced
with any other option y ∈ X . Since xCW ∈ [x, x], we know that there ex-
ists a type θCWi in all groups i who is such that θ
CW
i = θ
∗
i (x
CW )— i.e., that
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ui(x
CW , θCWi ) ≥ ui(y, θ
CW
i ), ∀y ∈ X . Assume that y < x
CW . This in turns means,
using Assumption 1, that, inside each group i, we have that
∀θ ≥ θCWi , ui(x
CW , θ) ≥ ui(y, θ).
This guarantees that at least a fraction 1−Fi(θ
CW
i ), in each group i, will support
xCW when faced against y. By definition of xCW (see equation (2)), this support
aggregates to one half over all groups, so that xCW can not be defeated at the
majority by y.
The case where y > xCW is proved likewise, using the contrapositive of Assumption
1.
(c) Take any 3 options {a, b, c} ∈ X all differing from xCW , with a > b > c. Agents
θ∗i (x
CW ) need not share the same preferences when comparing these options, so it
is always possible to construct examples where any type θ∗i (x
CW ) is in the minority
when comparing two of them. Hence, the social preference need not correspond
to the preferences of any type θ∗i (x
CW ) (or of any other type). We now show that
this does not imply that majority voting cycles exist. Given Assumptions 1 to 3,
there exist, in all groups i, types θabi , θ
ac
i and θ
bc
i that are indifferent, respectively,
between options a and b, a and c, and b and c. Also, Assumption 2 implies that
θabi > θ
ac
i > θ
bc
i . All individuals with θ < θ
bc
i then prefer c to b and b to a (and
thus c to a), all individuals with θbci < θ < θ
ac
i prefer b to c to a, all agents with
θaci < θ < θ
ab
i prefer b to a to c, while all agents with θ > θ
ab prefer a to b to c. It
is easy to see that, with such preferences, there cannot be a majority voting cycle
encompassing a, b and c, even if the distribution of types and the identity of the
threshold types differ from one group to another. Note also that this precludes
cycles between any four options, since such cycles would imply the existence of
at least one cycle between three options. Applying repeatedly this observation to
cycles of larger length, we obtain that there is no majority voting cycle of any
length.

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Given the continuity and strict monotonicity of Mi(θ) postulated in Assump-
tion 2, for all x ∈ X , there exists one type of voters in every group that most-
prefers this option x to any other feasible option. This type plays a role of “anchor”
in the group, which allows to apply the separation argument at the heart of the
usual, one-group, median voter theorem with SCP. Observe that these anchors
need not correspond to the same type θ in all groups, and that they need not
be the median θ voters inside each group separately. Also, there is no need for
these anchors to be actually represented in all groups: we need not impose that
fi(θ
∗
i (x
CW )) > 0 for anchor θi in any group i. It is easy to see that the Condorcet
winner is unique if, for all x ∈ X , fi(θ
∗
i (x)) > 0 for at least one group i.
These anchors need not be decisive for all pairwise majority comparisons —
i.e., when comparing any two options x and y other than xCW . It is indeed easy
to construct examples where any anchor is in the minority for some vote pairing
options different from xCW . The separation argument then shows that, in certain
groups, individuals with a type lower than the anchor’s prefer x to y, while in
other groups types larger than the anchor’s prefer x to y. Since anchors need
not be the median θ voters of their own group, there is no way at this level of
generality to assess whether x is majority preferred to y. This line of reasoning
suggests that majority cycles (not including xCW of course) may exist, since no
type need be decisive in all pairwise majority comparisons. We show that it
is not the case: Assumptions 1 to 3 impose sufficient structure on individual
preferences to prevent the existence of a majority voting cycle of any length. In
other words, with multiple groups SCP guarantees that the majority voting social
preference is acyclic, although it need not correspond to the preference of any
specific individual, including the anchors.
3 Conclusion
We show in De Donder (2012) that our results extend to the case where Mi(θ)
is a correspondence and increases weakly with θ for all i. Several anchors may
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most-prefer the same option in any group, and the Condorcet winner may not
be unique even if, for all x ∈ X, fi(θ
∗
i (x)) > 0 for at least one group i. We also
show there that the continuity assumption of Mi(θ) is crucial to our results since
it ensures that anchors exist for all values of x.
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